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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS
Upstream – Federal
8th Circuit
Roberts v. Unimin Corp., 883 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2018).
Lessors claimed that a 1961 mining lease to Lessee should be deemed a
tenancy at will and that the lease which provided for use as long as mining
activities occurred on the property was unconscionable and had led to
Lessee’s unjust enrichment. The trial court found that the lease created a
determinable leasehold, and Lessors appealed that ruling in response. On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the lease in question
as well as the characteristics of both a tenancy at will and determinable
leaseholds. The Eighth Circuit ultimately agreed that the interest created
was a determinable leasehold. Accordingly, the court found that the
leasehold in question created a determinable amount of time because it
provided that it shall remain in effect as long as mining activities are
actively occurring on the land. The determining event was not too vague
and was the common and accepted lease language for mining leases.
9th Circuit
Gardner v. Chevron Capital Corp., 715 Fed. App'x 737 (9th Cir. 2018).
Landowner brought suit against Gas Station Operator (“Operator”) for its
contamination of property. The trial court dismissed Landowner’s claim for
failure to state a claim because Landowner only alleged contamination of
property through substances that fell within the petroleum exception under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (“CERCLA”). Landowner appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the lower court, finding
that Landowner was unable to sufficiently allege that xylene, the substance
that contaminated Landowner’s property, was not a substance that derived
from petroleum, and thus, did not fall under the petroleum exception of
CERCLA. Because the appellate court found that landowner was not able to
offer any details to support allegations that xylene was not a petroleumbased chemical, the suit was barred under CERCLA, and the claim was
dismissed with prejudice.
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10th Circuit
Trans-W. Petroleum, Inc. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 718 Fed. App'x 712 (10th
Cir. 2018).
Buyer of an oil and gas lease (“Buyer”) brought suit against the seller of the
lease (“Seller”) for breach of contract when Seller attempted to rescind the
lease before the lease took effect, instead extending its own lease on the
property. At trial, the court granted Buyer declaratory judgment after
finding Seller’s prior lease on the land had expired on the date Buyer’s
intended lease was to take effect. Seller appealed this decision. On appeal,
the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court
regarding the breach of contract. However, the appellate court found that
the lower court erred when it declined to award Buyer damages for failure
to show lost profits. The appellate court ruled that Buyer had shown with
reasonable certainty that it suffered around $4,800,000 in lost profits as a
result of Seller’s breach, an amount which need not be calculated to
mathematical certainty.
N.D. West Virginia
Fout v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:15CV68, 2018 WL 1595870 (N.D. W. Va.
Apr. 2, 2018).
Lessors owned an undivided interest in oil and natural gas subject to a lease
agreement with Developer, which secured Lessors a flat-rate royalty
payment in exchange for development and production rights. Lessors
contended that Developer underpaid the royalties owed and incorrectly
deducted from the royalties, as well as failed to provide a truthful
accounting of production on the lease. The district court determined that
Lessors did not present evidence sufficient to prove (1) failure to properly
account, (2) breach of contract, (3) fraud, or (4) negligent
misrepresentation. Additionally, the court pointed out that punitive damages
were not available in this case because Lessors had previously waived their
right to punitive damages, and such remedy would not be available
regardless in a contract claim, as was the case here.
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Lucey v. SWN Prod. Co., LLC, No. 5:17–CV–66, No. 5:17–CV–126, 2018
WL 771725 (N.D.W. Va. Feb. 7, 2018).
Landowners entered into an oil and gas lease with Producer. Operator
attempted to extend the lease, but the extension was denied by Landowners.
Landowners subsequently brought suit seeking a declaration by the court
that the lease had been terminated. The matter, however, was settled and
dismissed by both parties. The settlement provided for an oil and gas lease
between the two parties, subject to more requirements, with the right of
Producer to pool the lease with other units. When Producer pooled the lease
into a unit, Landowners brought suit for breach of contract, declaratory
judgment, trespass, and private nuisance. Landowners claimed that the
agreement required Operator to pay additional consideration if it failed to
commence production on 2 wells on the property within 1 year of the
effective date. However, Landowner claimed that because Operator
obtained permits to pool the land before the effective date of the lease, the
wells that were produced by Operator were not within the date specified.
Thus, Operator breached the contract by not paying consideration for the
lack of wells drilled within the specified date. Operator defended by
claiming that Landowners failed to state a claim, because under the
language of the contract, there was no breach. Trial court found that the
lack of evidence of actual injury and failure to provide notice of the breach
by Producer was sufficient to uphold Operator’s argument for failure to
state a claim. Trial Court dismissed the claim accordingly. Please note that
Landowners have since filed an appeal to the Fourth Circuit.
S.D. California
Plumley v. Sempra Energy, No. 3:16-cv-00512-BEN-AGS, 2018 WL
1470224 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018).
This case constituted a class-action suit against Energy Services Company
(“Company”). The complaint centered around a natural gas leak in Aliso
Canyon, California. Investors sued Company, alleging that Company made
false and/or materially misleading statements regarding Company’s
commitment to safety, the scope of the Aliso Canyon gas leak, and the risks
posed by the gas leak. The complaint alleged violations against the
Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”)
Rule 10b-5. Company moved for and was awarded a dismissal of the first
complaint for failing to adequately plead the existence of materially false or
misleading statements. The California district court found that Investors had
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not meet the pleading burden to establish a strong inference of scienter
against Company. Investors presented evidence that Company had both (1)
knowledge that the gas well in question lacked a proper safety valve and (2)
a financial motive and opportunity to omit the information from its reports,
but the court stated that although the allegations showed a motive and
opportunity to commit fraud, there was not a strong inference of deliberate
recklessness.
Upstream – State
Louisiana
J & L Oil Co. v. KM Oil Co., 51-898 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18) No. 51,898CA, 2018 WL 1075402.
An oil and gas lease containing a Pugh clause provided that Lessee must
drill five wells within a given time period. Moreover, Lessee must continue
to produce in paying quantities in order to hold the entire acreage under the
lease. Based on the language of the lease, with which the Court of Appeal
of Louisiana agreed, if the five wells were not drilled within the time period
or ever ceased to produce in paying quantities, then only a small amount of
acreage surrounding the producing wells would be held by the lease. There
was no question raised whether or not the five wells were drilled within the
allotted time, however, there was question as to whether the lease was held
by production. The court held that Lessor did not bear its burden of
showing that there was no disruption in production on the five wells and
that the subsequent producers adequately pointed out an absence of facts
proving that there was continuous production.
State v. Louisiana Land & Expl. Co., 2017-830 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/14/18)
No. CA 17–830, 2018 WL 1312208.
School Board sued Developer, seeking remediation of environmental
damage caused by oil and gas exploration and production. Under
Louisiana’s Oilfield Remediation Statute, the remediating party is obligated
to receive awarded damages only for remediation as required to fund the
expressed plan. On appeal, following a jury verdict in favor of School
Board, School Board argued that it is the proper party to accept damages
and perform remediation. The appellate court held that, because the Oilfield
Remediation Statute's purpose is to create an obligation to perform
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remediation work, the trial court was correct in determining that Developer
was responsible for the mandated remediation.
New York
Keyspan Gas E. Corp. v. Munich Reinsurance Am., Inc., 96 N.E.3d 209
(N.Y. 2018).
Insured sought declaratory judgment asserting that it was entitled to
coverage and indemnification from Insurer for costs of environmental
cleanup at two former manufactured gas plant sites. Insurer argued that it
was not liable to cover costs incurred by Insured that occurred outside of
the policy period and that any costs it was entitled to cover should be
allocated pro rata over the entire period during which property damage
occurred. However, Insured claimed that Insurer was liable for this time
period because there was no applicable insurance coverage available on the
market. The district court denied Insurer’s motion for partial summary
judgment regarding the years in which the relevant insurance coverage was
otherwise unavailable in the marketplace. Insurer appealed, and the
appellate court ruled that under the applicable insurance policies, Insurer
was not obligated to indemnify Insured for losses that were attributable to
time periods when liability insurance was otherwise unavailable in the
marketplace.
Pennsylvania
EQT Prod. Co. v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot. of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, No. 6 MAP 2017, 2018 WL 1516385 (Pa. Mar. 28, 2018).
Oil Producer became subject to civil penalties under the Clean Streams Law
in 2012 due to leaks of impaired water from hydraulic fracture gas wells.
Environmental Department theorized that the penalty should have been
based on a “continuing violation,” wherein the penalty would last as long as
any contaminants remained in the subsurface soil to passively enter into
groundwater. Oil Producer expressed concerns that this theory would create
uncertainty and unending liability. Oil Producer’s own theory was based on
penalty being assessed and doled out for only days that pollutants were
discharged from impoundment. Oil Producer at the time filed suit seeking
declaration of unlawful calculation of the penalties. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania determined that mere presence of contaminants in water
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sources is not a violation of the Clean Streams Law which cites movement
as the necessary element.
Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 2018 PA Super 79.
Landowners owned eleven acres in Pennsylvania, adjacent to two different
gas wells operated by Natural Gas Developer (“Developer”). These wells
have been continuously operated since 2011. Landowner asserted trespass
and conversion claims against Developer, alleging that Developer had been
unlawfully extracting natural gas from beneath Landowners’ property. On
motions of summary judgment by both parties, the trial court determined
that the rule of capture precluded recovery by Landowners. Landowners
appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, claiming that the trial court
erred in its determination that rule of capture precluded any liability on the
part of Developer. As this was a question of first impression, the appellate
court examined all evidence including (1) the depth of the alleged
subsurface trespass, (2) the amount of oil and gas that was alleged to have
been taken, and (3) the time period that had passed during the ongoing
“trespass.” The appellate court determined that, although there did not seem
to be evidence as to how far the subsurface fractures extended into
Landowners’ property, there was a proper question of whether a trespass
had occurred, and the entry of summary judgment for Developer was
premature.
Texas
Allen Drilling Acquisition Co. v. Crimson Expl. Inc., No. 10–15–00277–
CV, 2018 WL 1219122 (Tex. App. Mar. 7, 2018).
Two Operators entered into a Joint Operating Agreement together for the
development and exploration of leased lands. The Majority Leaseholder
(Majority Operator) held 77.5% of the leasehold in the agreement while the
minority leaseholder (“Minority Operator”) owned the remaining 22.5% of
the leasehold. Majority Operator brought suit against Minority Operator for
breach of contract for its failure to pay its share of the costs of developing
the project. Minority Operator counterclaimed that because Majority
Operator failed to convey all of the leases required under the agreements,
Majority Operator breached the Joint Operating Agreement first. At trial,
Minority Operator motioned for summary judgment for its claims that
Majority Operator breached the agreement. However, the trial court denied
the motion and granted the Majority Operator summary judgment. Minority
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Operator appealed asserting that the trial court erred when it granted
Majority Operator’s summary judgment motion and denied its motion. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals of Texas, Waco reviewed whether the
agreements that embodied the Joint Operating Agreement entitled Minority
Operator to the leases it claimed it was entitled to. The appellate court
found that the trial court erred in its interpretations of the agreements, thus
its determination of which Operator breached the agreement and was
accordingly entitled to summary judgment was improper. Thus, the court
reversed the trial court’s ruling of summary judgment for Majority Operator
and remanded the case to the trial court with the proper interpretation of the
agreement.
Dimock Operating Co. v. Sutherland Energy Co., LLC, No. 07–16–00230–
CV, 2018 WL 1310095 (Tex. App. Mar. 13, 2018).
Lessee sued Operator, arguing that Operator collected more revenue than
was authorized in the parties’ Seismic Exploration and Farmout Agreement
(“SEFA”). The agreement provided that once Operator’s cumulative
revenue equaled two times Operator’s costs from the well’s production
revenue as compensation, Operator had reached “project payout.” Once
Operator reached “project payout,” Operator would assign its well
operations back to Lessee. Farmee claimed that Section 2.1 of the SEFA
gave Lessee sole discretion to determine the extent of expenditures
necessary for seismic exploration operation, and should thus be considered
in determining Farmee’s “costs.” Lessee claimed that Operator’s seismic
and land exploration expenditures were limited by an ensuing Operating
Agreement, restricting Farmee’s authorized “costs” to projects not
explicitly permitted by Lessee. The appellate court upheld the trial court in
finding that expenses incurred for land and seismic operations are “costs” to
be considered in determining “project payout” under the SEFA.
Furthermore, the appellate court upheld that Operator’s ability to incur
those costs were governed by the original SEFA agreement and not limited
by the ensuing Operating Agreement, which was meant to govern
expenditures made by Operator moving forward from the signing of that
agreement. Please note that this opinion has been withdrawn and
superseded on denial of rehearing.
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Martin v. Newfield Expl. Co., No. 13–17–00104–CV, 2018 WL 1633574
(Tex. App. Apr. 5, 2018).
In 2001, Lessor entered into oil and gas leases with Developer. These leases
covered the rights to production on approximately 600 acres of land. Over
the next seven years, different parts of the land were assigned from party to
party, eventually leading to Developer holding claim to fifty-five percent of
all leases therein. Developer subsequently filed a designation of pooled unit
on other nearby properties totaling 570 acres. Lessor asserted that
Developer wrongfully pooled its land and that it failed to protect against
drainage of Lessor’s unit as required under the lease agreements. Developer
filed for summary judgment stating that it had no interest in the lease
complained under and that it had no duty to protect against drainage
because Lessor’s land was not adjoined to the land Developer had pooled.
The trial court granted Developer’s motion for summary judgment and
Lessor appealed. On appeal, the court determined that even if Developer
did owe a duty to protect against drainage, the lands in question were not
“adjoining,” thus the duty was never triggered.
Midstream – Federal
2d Circuit
New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 884 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 2018).
Department requested judicial review of Commission’s decision to approve
natural gas pipeline construction, and Commission’s determination that
Department forfeited the authority to review and control certification
regarding water quality for the pipeline construction. Landowners
intervened in this action, siding with Department to also oppose
Commission’s actions regarding the pipeline construction. A Certificate of
Water Quality is generally needed for such projects and is requested from
Department because such a pipeline would contact and potentially impact
bodies of water in its construction path. After receiving the Company’s
request for a certificate, Department requested more information from
Company twice, determining each time that their application was
incomplete. Department ultimately rejected Company’s application for
construction, but Commission then approved the application and
determined that Department failed to respond within its allowed period for
review for a clean water certificate, which was one year. Thus, its authority
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to do so was deemed to be waived. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
denied Department’s request for review, also deeming them to have waived
the opportunity to manage the request for water quality certification, which
Company filed timely. The court gave no deference here to state agency,
because Commission was not in a position to approve their application of
the statutory requirements – in this case, the waiver period and when that
time period started to run. Commission, a federal agency, and Department,
a state agency, conflicted on their interpretations of when the waiver period
begins to run, and this court sided with Commission. This court also
determined that, as a federal agency, Commission did have jurisdiction to
decide on Company’s application for pipeline construction (over state
agency Department) because the pipeline is essentially part of an interstate,
not intrastate system of distribution.
D. District of Columbia
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16–1534
(JEB), 2018 WL 1385660 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2018).
Tribe challenged Agency’s allowance of oil pipeline construction on
property protected by preservation and conservation acts and other
requirements, including National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”),
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNIDRIP), asserting that
such construction disrupted their tribal lands. Both Tribe and Agency filed
motions for summary judgment asserting their opposing claims. In its
motion, Tribe claimed that Agency must evaluate the environmental
impacts caused by the pipeline holistically, rather than as “segmented”
impacts. Tribe also asserted that it was denied notice and consent, which is
in violation of treaty and trust requirements. Agency’s motion asserted that
the NHPA claim was inapplicable due to the completion of the pipeline
construction. The lower court held for Agency, determining that Tribe’s
action was properly brought, but ultimately held that Agency’s actions
authorizing the pipeline construction were not actually in violation of the
referenced regulations. This court affirmed the lower court’s decision in
favor of Agency, also concluding that Tribe had standing through its
demonstrated use and concern for the land, and potential injury by
Agency’s actions. The court also held, however, that no remedy was
available regarding the violation of NHPA claim because the pipeline
construction had already been completed. Numerous assessments were
conducted by NEPA with no significant issues reported. The outcome of
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these determinations was previously remanded for further review, which is
still pending. The court ultimately denied Tribe’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, dismissing Tribe’s first count, while granting Agency’s crossmotion for summary judgment.
N.D. West Virginia
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 84.53 Acres of Land, No. 1:18CV9,
2018 WL 1004483 (N.D.W. Va. Feb. 21, 2018).
Pipeline Operator sued Landowners, seeking condemnation and easements
related to the construction and operation of a natural gas pipeline.
Additionally, Pipeline Operator sought access and possession to land prior
to paying Landowners just compensation. After the issuance of a certificate
by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), Pipeline Operator’s
project was subject to the Natural Gas Act in order to acquire property
through eminent domain. The court found that Pipeline Operator was
entitled to a preliminary injunction in order to access and possess the
easements in order to avoid significant cost based on exigencies such as tree
clearing and inactivity. The district court also determined that, in
conjunction with granting Pipeline Operator's preliminary injunction for
access and use of Landowners' properties, Pipeline Operator would obtain
and post a surety bond to secure compensation.
W.D. Texas
Cotton v. Texas Express Pipeline, LLC, No. 6:16–CV–453–RP–JCM, 2018
WL 1419346, (W.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2018).
Landowner conveyed land, subject to an easement, to Purchaser through a
quitclaim deed. Purchaser brought suit for breach of contract claiming that
Landowner transported radioactive materials through the pipeline easement
against the terms of the easement contract. The contract provided that
natural gas and gas liquids are to be transported through the pipeline, but
radioactive materials are prohibited from being transported through the
pipeline. Landowner argued that the clause that permitted natural gas to be
transported rendered the prohibition against radioactive materials moot
because natural gas is radioactive. Thus, Landowner motioned to dismiss
the suit for failure to state a claim. A magistrate judge agreed with
Landowner and recommended dismissal of the claim. Purchaser objected to
this recommendation, and the case was removed to the Western District of
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Texas. The court, reviewing the recommendation by the magistrate judge de
novo, found that the magistrate ruled improperly when it recommended a
dismissal of the claim. The court instead found that all natural gas is not
radioactive and Purchaser should be entitled to amend its complaint to
account for its previous failure to plead that Landowner was actually
transporting ultra-hazardous material through the pipeline.
Midstream – State
Pennsylvania
B & R Res., LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 180 A.3d 812 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2018).
Company requested review of a Board adjudication decision dismissing
their appeal of an order issued by Agency requiring Company to plug
several dozens of their wells. Agency contacted Manager to inquire about
wells that appeared to be abandoned, later issuing a notice that Company
would be required to plug the wells. These orders were met with
noncompliance from Manager, and Agency requested additional
information regarding a proposed schedule for plugging the wells. Manager
asserted during these interactions that the wells were not abandoned, but
that Company still intended to use them for production. This
noncompliance with an order to plug the wells resulted in numerous alleged
violations by Company. Company later stipulated that the wells were
abandoned but that no funds were available to use for plugging the wells, so
Company should be relieved of liability. Company also stipulated that
Manager held no permits and did not operate any of the wells and thus
should also not be held responsible. During administrative adjudication,
Manager was determined to be an operator, with full authority to take
action of the wells, and was on notice regarding the requirement to plug the
wells. Therefore, Manager was personally responsible for the violations,
since its actions were intentionally in opposition to the imposed plugging
requirements, despite its authority to take action to comply with them.
However, this individual accountability, labeled “participation theory,” was
not supported by the administrative adjudication’s determination. The court
reversed and remanded because the reviewing administrative board failed to
assess Manager’s ability and resources to remedy the violations, or how
much Manager could have remedied the situation, if it had made an effort.
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Flynn v. Sunoco Pipeline L.P., No. 942 C.D. 2017, 2018 WL 1463443 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Mar. 26, 2018).
Landowners sued Public Utility Company (“Company”), arguing against
Company's development of a pipeline system. In 2012, Company
announced its intent to develop an integrated pipeline system to serve this
purpose, the Mariner East Program. The first phase of the program utilized
existing pipeline infrastructure to ship 70,000 barrels of natural gas liquids
across the state. The second phase of the program would require
construction of 351 miles of new pipeline to allow for movement of an
additional 275,000 barrels per day. Company received authorization for the
program’s second phase from the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
(“PUC”), and Landowners filed a complaint through enforcement of
Township’s Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance (“SALDO”).
The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, (2) the attempt to enforce SALDO
against Company was preempted by state and federal law, and (3) that
Landowners had failed to state a claim. The appellate court affirmed the
lower court’s decision, stating that Landowners had no claim under
SALDO because PUC had exclusive jurisdiction and regulatory authority
over Company.
MarkWest Liberty Midstream and Res., LLC v. Cecil Twp. Zoning Hearing
Bd., No. 1809 C.D. 2016, 2018 WL 1440892 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Mar. 23,
2018).
Company engaged in midstream services filed an application for a special
zoning exception from Board to construct a natural gas compressor. Board
added numerous conditions as a result of that special exception request,
from which Company appealed. The court began by noting that Board was
a legislatively created body that was given narrow powers to enforce health
and safety standards, but it was not given power to regulate the operations
of a private business. The court found that Board failed to show that
Company compressor’s impacts would pose a threat to the health and safety
of the community, and thus abused its discretion in enacting conditions
outside of Board’s authority. Upon reviewing each condition, it was found
that twenty-one of Board’s twenty-five imposed conditions were
unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. The only conditions found to be
reasonable and enforceable by the court were that Company: (1) provide a
spill prevention and control plan to the Township; (2) provide training for
first responders at its expense; (3) provide copies of all procedures to be
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followed in the event of an emergency at the site; and (4) work with local
first responders to outline procedures that nearby residents should observe
in the event of an emergency at the station. Please note that this is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Texas
Armour Pipe Line Co. v. Sandel Energy, Inc., No. 14–16–00490–CV, 2018
WL 1546697 (Tex. App. Mar. 28, 2018).
Assignors brought a claim against Assignees for ownership and payment
for royalty interest in oil and gas leases. This case is an appeal of the lower
court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment in favor of
Assignees and denying Assignors’ motion for summary judgment, rejecting
Assignors’ claimed royalty interest. The court reversed and remanded the
lower court’s decision, determining that the trial court was in error because
it granted a motion in favor of Assignees without adequate evidence that
Assignors held no royalty interest and then granted a motion dismissing an
accessory party, which was involved via farmout agreement on the basis of
the initial erroneous summary judgment. The court also held, however, that
the lower court was not in error in denying Assignors’ motion for summary
judgment, since there was still a valid question regarding Assignors’ stillheld royalty interest. The court determined that Assignors would have to
provide evidence that they were interest holders in the leases in place when
the assignment in question was executed and they have not presented
conclusive evidence to show this. The court relied on the remand procedure
to determine the alternative claim by Assignors, since the court reversed
and remanded the first claim, on which the second claim is dependent. The
court also reversed and remanded the lower court’s award to Assignees of
attorney fees since such an award is inappropriate considering the reversal
of their grant of summary judgment.
Downstream – Federal
10th Circuit
Anderson Living Tr. v. Energen Res. Corp., 886 F.3d 826 (10th Cir. 2018).
Landowners brought suit against Operator for failure to pay oil and gas
royalties. At trial, the lower court granted Operator’s motion for summary
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judgment on all claims. Landowners appealed. The appellate court upheld
some of the lower court’s rulings but reversed others. The court found, in
pertinent part, that the claims for royalties by Landowners based on state
law were properly denied because of the precedent of the circuit court
which rejected the marketable condition doctrine, that allowed Operator to
deduct certain marketing costs before calculating royalties. Additionally,
the court found in favor of Operator regarding whether it was proper to
deduct taxes from royalties owed. However, the appellate court reversed the
lower court’s decision regarding royalties to be paid to Landowners for gas
used by third-parties, ruling instead that the free use clauses in the lease
required Operator to pay royalties on all gas produced. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals thus remanded the case to the lower court to calculate the
royalties as provided by the opinion.
E.D. Michigan
MRP Props., LLC v. United States, No. 17–cv–11174, 2018 WL 1621562
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 4, 2018).
Company brought a claim against Government, requesting compensatory
damages and declaratory judgment for contamination and hazards that
Company claimed were allegedly caused by Government’s previous
wartime action and control. Government attempted to dismiss all parties
except Company or transfer the case to another venue. This attempt was
unsuccessful, so Government then filed a motion to dismiss. This motion
was granted because the court found that Company provided insufficient
evidence to support its claim for “arranger liability” which “attaches to
persons who specifically arrange for the disposal of that hazardous waste,”
even though it did have sufficient support for its “operator liability” claim
since it could show that Government exerted control over general
operations but not specific intent or specific actions regarding the subject
hazards or contamination. The court dismissed Company’s initial amended
complaint but designated such dismissal without prejudice to allow
Company to later file an amendment within a specific time, giving it an
opportunity to potentially provide more adequate support for its ‘arranger
liability’ claim.
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Downstream – State
New Jersey
Jack's Friendly Serv., Inc. v. Twp. of Fairfield Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
No. A–0433–16T4, 2018 WL 1440002 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 23,
2018).
Constructor who sought to build and operate a convenience store and gas
station on a tract of land sought variances and major site approval from the
Board of Zoning. The Board approved and granted requests of Constructor.
Interested Parties filed a complaint challenging the Board’s approval of
Constructor’s application claiming the Board erred because it failed to
apply the proper standards of analysis for the application. Upon review, the
trial court affirmed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the claim,
finding Interested Parties’ claims to be without merit. Interested Parties
appealed their case. On appeal, Interested Parties argued that the application
should not have been approved absent a showing that the proposed
construction would enhance the welfare of the township that had prohibited
new gas stations entirely. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the
lower court after citing that the Board was entitled to deference, and, unless
its decision was arbitrary and capricious, the court would not overturn it.
When applying the correct standards to the application, the court found no
reason to disturb the decisions of either the Board or the trial court. Please
note that this is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or
federal court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS
Federal
Supreme Court
Montana v. Wyoming, 138 S.Ct. 758 (2018).
Montana and Wyoming are subject to the Yellowstone River Compact
(“Compact”). Broadly, the Compact governs appropriative rights of the
Yellowstone River. After ordering that costs shall be awarded to Montana,
the Court provided several guidelines in its decree which are as follows.
The Court first provided some general provisions, which outlined the
compact and detailed the procedure for calls between the states. Next, it
appeared that the exercise pre-1950 appropriative rights were generally
non-violative of the Compact. The Court provided general reservoir rules
and also placed specific limitations on Wyoming storage reservoirs as well
as the Tongue River Reservoir. Montana and Wyoming are also bound by
rules regarding the exchange of information. Finally, the Court’s decree has
no impact on “the water rights of any Indian Tribe or Indian reservation.”
2d Circuit
Bethpage Water Dist. v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 884 F.3d 118 (2d Cir.
2018).
Water District brought suit against industrial manufacturer
(“Manufacturer”) alleging groundwater pollution due to operations at its
manufacturing facilities. Water District asserted claims of negligence,
trespass, and nuisance for the alleged contamination caused by volatile
organic compounds entering multiple drinking water units operated by
Water District. However, the issue presented to the court concerned when
the statute of limitations for the listed claims should begin when said claims
are caused by water pollution. Specifically, the court looked at whether its
discovery igniting the statute of limitations began once (1) the pollution
was detected in the well, (2) actual injury occurred, or (3) when Water
District learned of the potential need to remediate or protect the well from
contamination, either present or future. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals ultimately determined that the statute of limitations for claims
arising out of contamination begin when the injured party had enough
knowledge that the contamination would require “an immediate or specific
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remediation effort.” The court rejected the notion that the statute of
limitations begins only after there is actual contamination, rather than the
mere existence of potential for contamination, in the well.
9th Circuit
Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018).
County appealed a lower court finding that County was in violation of the
Clean Water Act (“CWA”). County operated four injection wells used to
disposed of treated wastewater from its municipal wastewater plant. The
treated wastewater is either injected into the wells for disposal or sold for
irrigation purposes. The injected, polluted water may then find its way into
the Pacific Ocean. County challenged the lower courts fining that it was in
violation of the CWA through use of all four of its wells by not obtaining a
special permit before discharging the treated water into the ocean via
groundwater. On appeal, the court agreed with the lower court’s ruling that
County was liable under the CWA. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling for the following reasons: (1)
there was an immediately traceable source of the pollution – a “point
source” under the act; (2) the act requires a permit to discharge into the
ocean, even if the discharge was not direct, because the pollution was
traceable; and (3) discharge into wells and not navigable waters is not
excluded by the CWA.
Federal Circuit
Meridian Eng’g Co. v. United States, 885 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Contractor sued the government alleging breach of contract, breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and a violation of the Contract Disputes
Act. The government tasked Contractor with constructing flood control
features and the parties' contract was later modified several times after
Contractor discovered potential structural damage due to an unforeseen
water-producing sand layer, groundwater, and saturated soil. After the
government suspended Contractor's work based on structural failure, the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers terminated the flood control project. Ruling
in favor of the government, the Federal Circuit found that saturated soils
had been indicated in the contract and that Contractor had not undergone a
Type 1 differing site condition. The court found that Contractor was not
acting as a reasonable and prudent contractor in failing to foresee the
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saturated soil and saturated subsurface conditions since the contract had
made reasonably accurate representations of the location conditions.
E.D. California
N. Coast Rivers All. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 1:16–cv–00307–LJO–
MJS, 2018 WL 1256657 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2018).
Conservationist filed a claim of relief, claiming that the Department of the
Interior (“Department”) violated the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”) by failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
(“EIS”) for a series of renewal contracts that authorize the delivery of water
from federal reclamation facilities to certain water districts within
California. Department filed for dismissal of the claim because (1) the
contracts do not alter the status quo of current water delivery systems, and
(2) that an EIS is only required in Federal actions which significantly affect
the quality of the human environment. The court found that because the
contracts were not an irreversible commitment of resources, an EIS was not
necessary. Therefore, the court granted Department’s motion to dismiss.
E.D. New York
Hicksville Water Dist. v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No. 2:17-cv-04442
(ADS)(ARL), 2018 WL 1542670 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018).
Water Provider is a public utility that obtains its water form the Long Island
Aquifer System. Electronics Manufacturer performs machining, heat
treating, and chemical cleaning among other operations at a property
alongside the Long Island Railroad tracks. Water Provider alleged that
Electronics Manufacturer used Dioxane in its manufacturing process
throughout use of the property. This chemical completely dissolves in water
and is widely used in paint strippers, greases, and waxes. The chemical has
been cited as likely carcinogenic to humans and can cause damage to the
liver and kidneys. Electronics Manufacturer had ceased its operations at the
factory in 2014 and reported to have removed all manufacturing equipment.
Water Provider was forced to shut down one of its wells and alleged that
Electronics Manufacturer contaminated its groundwater and was liable for
remedial damages in the amount of $350,000,000 in addition to
$600,000,000 in punitive damages. Defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint. The district court determined that Electronics Manufacturer’s
motion should be granted due to the fact that Water Provider was precluded
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from advancing on negligence or trespass claims, but denied that Water
Provider was able to proceed on all other counts including its public
nuisance, failure to warn, and Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act claims.
N.D. Oklahoma
Taylor v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., No. 14–CV–293–JED–FHM, 2018 WL
1569495 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 30, 2018).
Citizens sued Tire Company alleging that their personal and real property
had been contaminated by toxins released as a result of Tire Company’s
conduct. Citizens sought damages for medical monitoring certification of
the citizens who resided on the property, as well as damages for the
recovery of real property affected by the toxins. In addition to damages,
Citizens sought injunctive relief requiring Tire Company to remediate all
contaminated properties. Tire Company moved for summary judgment
claiming that the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality
(“ODEQ”) had primary jurisdiction over remediation for the contaminated
property and thus the request for injunctive relief for such should be denied.
The trial court rejected this argument and denied Tire Company’s request
for partial summary judgment on the ground that the primary jurisdiction
doctrine does not prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction where an
agency fails to diligently pursue enforcement against a party violating
regulation. Additionally, Tire Company asserted that the claims for medical
monitoring costs should be dismissed because Oklahoma courts have not
allowed such claims for relief without proof that parties actually suffered
physical injury. The trial court agreed and dismissed Citizens’ request for
medical monitoring damages due to their failure to present evidence of
physical injuries attributable to contaminates from the plant. The trial court
also denied Tire Company’s motion for summary judgment on claims by
fifty-two Citizens who purchased their property after 2002, because it found
a genuine dispute was present regarding whether there was a diminution in
the value of the property of those individuals due to continuing
contamination after 2002.
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State
California
Santa Barbara Channelkeeper v. City of San Buenaventura, 228 Cal. Rptr.
3d 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
Environmental Organization filed suit against City, alleging that City’s
diversion of water from a local river was “unreasonable” due to its effect on
fish during the summer when water levels are low. City filed a crosscomplaint against other parties who also divert water from the river,
alleging that it is the other parties whose water diversion is “unreasonable.”
The trial court struck City’s cross-complaint, and City appealed. The
California appellate court held that (1) reasonableness of water usage is a
case-by-case determination, and although in California there is public trust
interest in how the state’s water is used, that interest is not absolute; (2) in
order for a cross-claim to be proper, the claims must be “related to the same
transaction,” and the relation is determined by the facts surrounding the
cause of action; and (3) regardless of Environmental Organization’s interest
in proceeding solely against City, City had the right to bring in the other
potentially liable parties in order for the court to examine whether junior or
senior appropriators must share the obligation to maintain a higher water
level in the river during summer months. The court held that because
Environmental Organization was complaining based only on the water flow
in the river, the court must consider other water users before it was able to
issue even a declaratory judgment. The court also found a second reason to
reverse the trial court’s striking of the cross-complaint in that the claim at
issue implicated City’s property rights, giving it the right to cross-complain
under California’s Civil Procedure laws. Accordingly, the appellate court
reversed the trial court’s decision to strike City’s cross-complaint and
remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its judgment.
Connecticut
Town of Glastonbury v. Metro. Dist. Comm’n, 179 A.3d 201 (Conn. 2018).
Non-Member Town (“Town”) sued Water Provider, alleging that Water
Provider charged Town an illegal surcharge for its services. After the court
of original jurisdiction found in Town’s favor and granted summary
judgment, the state legislature passed a bill allowing Water Provider to
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establish a surcharge on non-member towns, subject to certain limitations.
Water Provider attempted to dismiss the ruling based on the retroactive
legislation but the court determined the legislation was not retroactive, and
therefore did not affect the prior unlawful surcharges. On appeal, Water
Provider claimed error on the part of the district court determining that
plaintiff’s claim was not rendered moot by the legislation. The Supreme
Court of Connecticut determined that the claim was justiciable and that
Town’s status as non-member town did not disqualify it from bringing the
suit. Additionally, the Court concluded that prior to enactment of the
legislation, Water Provider did not have authority to impose the surcharge
on the non-member towns, ruling in favor of Town.
Idaho
Lemhi Cty. v. Moulton, 414 P.3d 226 (Idaho 2018).
Downhill Landowner (“Downhill”) was in a dispute with Uphill Landowner
(“Uphill”) as to whether irrigation wastewater could flow across Downhill’s
property into an adjoining river. This case follows a claim brought
successfully by County in which it asserted Downhill was blocking the flow
of Uphill’s irrigation wastewater from reaching the river via a draw on
Downhill’s property. The blockage caused County’s road to flood. Thus,
Downhill was forced to allow the flow of wastewater. Subsequently,
Downhill claimed Uphill sent too much water down the draw and
challenged Uphill’s ability to send the wastewater across Downhill’s land.
The lower court found that the draw on Downhill’s property was a natural
waterway and that Uphill accordingly had a natural servitude and a
prescriptive easement in which to send a certain volume of wastewater
across Downhill’s land to the river. Downhill challenged the establishment
of the easement and the scope of the easement granted. The Supreme Court
of Idaho held that the lower court correctly found the presence of the
requisite factors for a prescriptive easement and also held that the scope of
the easement was appropriate. Downhill also challenged the basis for the
natural servitude theory, but the court found that the natural basin drainage
was a natural watercourse in which wastewater could flow, subject to the
volume limitation set by the lower court. However, the court did find that
the lower court did not adequately describe the location of the drainage
basin for the prescriptive easement or natural servitude and the court should
have better identified the property subject to the easement. Therefore, the
Supreme Court of Idaho remanded the case to the district court for
modification of its previous judgment.
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Montana
Teton Coop. Reservoir Co., 2018 MT 66, 391 Mont. 66, 414 P.3d 1249.
Irrigation Company appealed a decision by a water court. In 1902,
Irrigation Company filed a Notice of Appropriation claiming 3,000 cubic
feet per second from the Tenton River for irrigation and claiming of lands.
A Secondary Irrigation Company later began using portions of water that
Irrigation Company had claimed. Irrigation Company brought complaints
regarding the water rights claims of Secondary Irrigation Company, as well
as a dissatisfied water user complaint because a water commissioner
reduced its flow to half of that available in the Teton River. The district
court removed these claims to the state water court. The state water court
found that the 1902 Notice of Appropriation was valid. However, Irrigation
Company was barred by the doctrine of laches from claiming senior priority
of its 1902 notice. Both parties appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Montana upheld the water court’s decision, holding that the water court did
not err in finding that the 1902 Notice of Appropriation was valid but the
claim brought by Irrigation company was barred by the doctrine of laches.
Nevada
King v. St. Clair, 414 P.3d 314 (Nev. 2018).
Landowner found an abandoned well on his property and applied for a
permit requesting to temporarily change the point of diversion from that
well to another location on Landowner’s property for the water source
located underground. Upon review, the State Engineer (“Engineer”) denied
the permit application, finding that although a prior owner had established a
vested right to the water source, a following owner had abandoned that
right due to non-use. This finding was overruled by the district court which
found that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate an intent to
abandon the water ownership right on the part of any previous owner. The
Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed, holding that Engineer’s finding that
non-use alone was sufficient to establish an intent to abandon water rights
was a misapplication of Nevada law. Rather, the party asserting
abandonment of a water right must prove with clear and convincing
evidence that Landowner or any prior owners intended to abandon it, which
was not found here.
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New Mexico
Gila Res. Info. Project v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Comm’n,
2018-MNSC-025, 2018 WL 1192748.
This case arises out of a compilation of cases in which environmental
organization and various other parties (“Environmental Organization”) filed
suit seeking review of Water Control Commission’s (“Commission”)
enactment of an amendment to the Water Quality Act (“Act”), arguing that
the amendment actually violated the Act. The Amendment in question
provided new regulation for the copper industry. The New Mexico Supreme
Court held that (1) the regulation was based on a permissible construction
of the Act because the language, “place of withdrawal,” within the
regulation did not suggest a categorical bar on the regulation’s containment
strategy, but rather gave Commission flexibility to implement practices that
it deemed prudent; (2) the regulation did not permit “widespread
pollution . . . at open pit copper mine facilities”; (3) even if the regulation
created a “point of compliance” system, the Act did not prohibit such a
system; (4) even if the regulation broke from past Commission practice, a
legislative decision put Environmental Organization on notice that such
variation was possible, and moreover, Commission was not constrained by
prior decisions; and (5) Environmental Organization’s contentions that the
regulation’s closure provisions were improper were baseless. Accordingly,
the Court determined that the regulation did not violate the Water Quality
Act and thus affirmed Commission’s adoption of the regulation.
State ex rel. State Engr. v. United States, No. A-1-CA-33535, 2018 WL
1616612 (N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2018).
The United States has had an extensive relationship with the Navajo Nation,
dating back to 1849 when the parties entered into a peace treaty moving the
Navajo people to eastern New Mexico. A second treaty then moved the
Navajo Nation to a portion of their ancestral territory as their “permanent
home.” This tribal movement led to a claim on the part of the tribe
regarding the water feeding into the San Juan River from the Colorado
River through the Grand Canyon. In 2005, after a decade of negotiation, the
claims of the Navajo Nation were settled. State’s legislature then
appropriated $50,000,000 to pay State’s cost of the settlement agreement
and brought suit seeking judicial approval regarding State’s share of the
water. The district court ruled in the affirmative on all counts and approved
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the settlement. The court rejected all objections by non-settling parties, all
of whom then appealed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals. Because the
parties all appealed separately from each other and on more than fifty
different claims, the appellate court ruled on them categorically. Ultimately,
the appellate found that the district court’s finding was fair and adequate to
the public interest, state laws, and federal laws.
North Carolina
Wilkie v. City of Boiling Spring Lakes, 809 S.E.2d 853 (N.C. 2018).
Landowner sued City after City artificially raised the water level of the lake
on which Landowner owned property, resulting in Landowner losing
significant amounts of usable land. Landowner alleged that the action
amounted to a taking of his property for which he was not compensated by
City. The trial court ruled in favor of Landowner. On appeal, City claimed
that because the action was not taken in furtherance of public use or
purpose, Landowner’s claim for inverse condemnation was unjustified. The
appellate court reversed the trial court’s finding, holding that there can be
no inverse condemnation when property is not taken for a public use. The
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the appellate court decision,
holding that the language of N.C.G.S. §40A-51(a) only specifies which
entities against whom a statutory inverse claim can be asserted, not the
purposes for which a claim may be brought. The court remanded the case to
the appellate court for review of Landowner’s remaining challenges to the
trial court’s order.
Oregon
Ciecko v. Dept. of Land Conservation & Dev., 415 P.3d 1122 (Or. Ct. App.
2018).
Individuals brought challenge against Conservation Department concerning
the validity of rule development for part five of the 1994 Territorial Sea
Plan (“TSP”). The Ocean Policy Advisory Council (“OPAC”) was
developed in 1991 to assist Conservation Department in managing
Oregon’s territorial sea. The TSP has since gone through multiple editions
with the rules being edited to best serve their purpose and protect coastal
waters. In 2008, OPAC began work on part five of the TSP, proposing and
discussing different amendments, most of which were focused on
renewable energy sites and where best to locate them and protect the
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surrounding area from any negative effects. After extensive discussions
between OPAC and Conservation Department concerning how best to
amend the TSP, OPAC proposed multiple amendments, which
Conservation Department then reviewed and modified before submitting
the edited TSP. Individuals brought this suit concerning the rule-making
process, claiming that Conservation Department violated state-based
statutory rule-making procedures. Individuals alleged that the rules allowed
for Conservation Department to modify any amendments to the TSP by
OPAC, but that it must then return them to OPAC for revision. The court
agreed, and because Conservation Department did not follow this
procedure, the appellate court ruled in favor of Individuals, holding the
amendments invalid.
Tennessee
StarLink Logistics, Inc. v. ACC, LLC, No. M2014–00362–COA–R3–CV,
2018 WL 637941 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2018).
Property Owner filed claims against Landfill Operator after it was
discovered that a landfill controlled by Landfill Operator, which primarily
held aluminum recycling waste, was leaching chloride and ammonia into
groundwater and surface water of two lakes owned by the Property Owner.
Landfill Operator and State of Tennessee (“State”) developed a plan to
remediate and prevent storm water from entering the site. Property Owner
claimed that the adopted plan was inadequate to prevent leaching of
pollutants into lakes. Additionally, Property Owner claimed that the
adopted plan did not provide oversight via a permit under the federal Clean
Water Act (“CWA”) and rather, would allow for continued contamination
into the lakes from the landfill site. However, the Court of Appeals of
Tennessee found that the adopted plan did not allow for infinite pollution
into the lakes and that the plan was the only cost-effective way of
remediating the site. Further, Property Owner claimed that the state agency
involved did not have authority under state law to implement the adopted
plan, but the court found the state was not obligated to follow federal law
requiring a permit under the CWA, and instead, state environmental law
could be applied.
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Texas
URI, Inc. v. Kleberg Cty., 61 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 565 (Tex. 2018).
County sued Company for breach of contract, alleging that a prior
settlement agreement demanded that Company restore all drinking and
agricultural waters affected by Company’s mining operation to an
acceptable quality before mining operations could resume. The lower courts
found in favor of County by allowing extrinsic evidence at the time of the
settlement’s execution to prove the intent of the parties. On appeal, the
Court determined that there was no evidence of “proof” that the water
quality had returned to consumable quality. Instead, the settlement only
required a statement from Company’s officer certifying to the judge that
well restoration was completed before mining could commence. There was
not any requirement for that assertion to be honest. Therefore, because the
trial court found that the breach was unintentional and without deliberate
intent, there was no bad faith on the part with regard to the water quality,
and Company had not breached the settlement agreement.
Washington
Brewer v. Lake Easton Homeowners Ass’n, 413 P.3d 16 (Wash. Ct. App.
2018).
Landowners sued Homeowners Association (“HOA”) over a water systems
agreement (“Agreement”). In relevant part, the agreement in conjunction
with the formation of the HOA “delegate[d] their water management
obligations [instead of taking] them on directly.” This is due, in part, to the
valid formation of the HOA. The HOA is valid because it meets all three
requirements of a valid HOA: that it is “[1] a corporation, unincorporated
association, or other legal entity, each member of which [2] is an owner of
residential real property located within the association’s jurisdiction, as
described in the governing documents, and [3] by virtue of membership or
ownership of property is obligated to pay real property taxes, insurance
premiums, maintenance costs, or for improvement of real property other
than that which is owned by the member.” Consequently, assessments were
properly paid to the HOA.
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Chelan Basin Conservancy v. GBI Holding Co., 413 P.3d 549 (Wash.
2018).
Conservation Organization sued Landfill Owner, alleging that Landfill
Owner’s fill of a dam built in 1927 raised property elevation and obstructed
the public right to use navigable waters. Company argued that the State of
Washington’s RCS 90.58.270 (“Savings Clause”), which protected
legislative consent to projects built before 1967 that violate public water
rights, barred the action. Conservation Organization disagreed, arguing that
the dam violated the public nuisance statute of the state, which was enacted
prior to the Savings Clause. The court ruled in favor of Landfill Owner,
holding that the Savings Clause’s purpose was to protect all such project
built before 1967, regardless of whether they violated pre-existing public
nuisance statutes.
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SELECTED LAND DECISIONS
Easements – Federal
6th Circuit
Johnson v. APJ Props., LLC, No. 17-1970, 2018 WL 1633467 (6th Cir.
Apr. 5, 2018).
Landowner sued Property Company (“Company”), alleging that Company
overburdened its prescriptive easement over Landowner’s property by
acquiring an additional parcel adjacent to Landowner’s property and
erecting a boathouse and other additions. Landowner argued that the
improvements exceeded the easement’s historical scope. The district court
denied Landowner’s request for an injunction, and the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed, holding that there is no per se overburdening of an
easement by the addition of land to a dominant estate. Rather, the appellate
court ruled that only an increase in the actual use of an easement may
overburden the easement.
D. Montana
Montana Mine Land Holdings, LLC v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., CV 17-65-HCCL, 2018 WL 1640866 (D. Mont. Apr. 5, 2018).
Mining Company held patented mining claims in the Helena-Lewis and
Clark National Forest. Two of the claims are served by a closed private
road under the 2005 North Belts Travel Plan (“Travel Plan”). According to
the Travel Plan, parties to the mining claims must apply for a special use
permit to access the road. Mining Company challenged this requirement,
asserting that it was entitled to use of the road by right of way conferred
upon the claims by the General Mining Act of 1872 before the national
forest was established. Mining Company sought declaratory judgment that
Federal Government cannot require the special use permit. The court,
however, determined that easements across federal lands are different than
those on private lands and that a drawing of a road on a patent document
does not provide an easement. The court also found that a grant of easement
by the United States must be expressed. Because there was no expressed
reference whatsoever on any document provided by Mining Company, the
court determined that Federal Government can require Plaintiffs to obtain a
special use permit for access to the private road.
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N.D. Ohio
Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, 295 F. Supp. 3d 776 (N.D.
Ohio Feb. 14, 2018).
Landowners brought suit against Gas Company alleging both trespass and
unjust enrichment claims, asserting that Gas Company unlawfully stored
gas underneath Landowner’s property before proper acquisition of rights to
the property occurred through eminent domain. The issues presented to the
court were: (1) whether Gas Company’s acts constituted trespass by storing
gas on Landowner’s property without first condemning gas storage
easements by eminent domain; and (2) whether the aforementioned conduct
unjustly enriched Gas Company. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio granted Gas Company’s motion for summary
judgment regarding trespass finding that (1) Gas Company’s failure to
pursue gas storage easements did not automatically invalidate its certificate
allowing gas storage; (2) Gas Company did not trespass because
Landowners could not meet their burden of proving that there was any
physical harm to their properties or any present or reasonably foreseeable
interference with the use of their respective properties; (3) Landowners did
not have standing to recover for unjust enrichment; and (4) Landowners are
not entitled to punitive damages because there was no evidence of actual
malice.
Nexus Gas Transmission, LLC v. City of Green, No. 5:17CV2062, 2018
WL 1638647 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2018).
Producers of a pipeline (“Producer”) sought preliminary injunction against
Landowners to access property owned by Landowners. The trial court
analyzed Producer’s motion for preliminary injunction by considering the 4
factors: (1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm to
movant, (3) whether injunction would cause substantial harm to others, and
(4) whether public interest would be served by injunction. The court found
that Producer had already met its burden for proof of success on the merits
on a summary judgment motion on the issue of condemnation.
Additionally, Producer submitted evidence showing it would incur roughly
$530,000 in losses if the property at issue was skipped in production of the
pipeline, due to Producer’s ongoing schedule. Landowners claimed that
they would suffer harm because the trees and soil on their land would be
destroyed. However, because Producer had access to the land through
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eminent domain, landowners would be compensated for any harm to their
property. Lastly, Producer claimed the pipeline is in the public interest
because it was being installed to ensure consumers would have access to
natural gas at reasonable prices. The court found in favor of Producer on all
factors and subsequently granted the preliminary injunction, permitting
Producer access to easement on Landowners’ property. Please note that an
appeal has been filed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
S.D. Indiana
Panhandle E. Pipe Line, Co., L.P. v. Plummer, No. 1:16-cv-02288-JMSDLP, 2018 WL 1505013 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2018).
Pipeline Owner brought suit against Landowners for failure to remove
obstructions for right-of-way easement, as required by an agreement
concerning the easement between the two parties. Pipeline Owner sought an
injunction prohibiting Landowner from interfering with access to the rightof-way easement as well as damages. Landowners counterclaimed that
Pipeline Owners had abandoned the pipeline subject to their agreement and
thus were not entitled to access to the easement. Both parties moved for
summary judgment. At trial, Landowners conceded that they had released
their abandonment claim in a previous agreement between the parties and
thus agreed summary judgment was proper with regards to that claim. The
court, however, also granted Pipeline Owner’s summary judgment motion
on the injunction after finding that all 4 factors considered for an injunction
weighed in favor of Pipeline Owner’s. Additionally, the court found that
Pipeline Owner had shown sufficient evidence proving it had suffered
$6,000 in damages as a result of mobilization and demobilization fees it
paid to clear the Property. Finally, the court found that in addition to the
$6,000 in damages, Pipeline Owner was also entitled to attorney’s fees and
costs, pursuant to the terms of the prior agreement between the parties.
S.D. West Virginia
Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. An Easement to Construct, Operate &
Maintain a 42-inch Gas Transmission Line, No. 2:17-cv-04214, 2018 WL
1004745 (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 21, 2018).
Company filed a partial motion for summary judgment and easement access
against Landowners, who also filed motions to dismiss and a motion to stay
proceedings. Company claimed power of eminent domain against
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Landowners through the authority of the Natural Gas Act and the Federal
Energy and Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and asserted that authority
after attempting to obtain the easements, which are required for Company’s
pipeline project, through negotiations with Landowner. Landowners
claimed that the court possessed the authority to review and approve the
stay, but the court disagreed, holding instead that Landowners’ challenges
may not be heard by the court because such eminent domain authority is
given by FERC and such review should be part of the condemnation
process. Accordingly, the court denied Landowners’ motions. The court
granted Company’s motion to strike and motion for a preliminary
injunction because Company was acting with the power of eminent domain,
and its actions were deemed to be in the public interest. Additionally, the
court held that Company’s eminent domain activity may not be stayed,
except by an appeal court or FERC, without creating significant harm;
therefore, the preliminary injunction was appropriate. Please note that this
case has been appealed and is pending in the 4th Circuit.
Easements – State
Alabama
Hubbard v. Cason, 2160473, 2018 WL 670470 (Ala. Civ. App. Feb. 2,
2018).
Landowner-1 filed a trespass suit against Landower-2 after a dispute
regarding ownership of a roadway that was used to access each owner’s
property. Landowner-1 claimed he was the owner of the roadway either by
deed or adverse possession. Landower-2 claimed that Landower-1 was
granted a right-of-way in the roadway and that he, Landowner-2, owned the
land subject to Landower-2’s easement in the roadway. The trial court
found that Landower-1, based on grant, and Landowner-2, based on adverse
possession, only had an easement in the roadway and the underlying
property was owned by a third landowner. On appeal, the Court of Civil
Appeals of Alabama reviewed past deeds and treatment of the property in
order to determine who owned rights in the roadway. The court held that
the deed, which originally granted the property now owned by Landower-1,
only granted an easement in the roadway. Therefore Landower-1 could not
own the roadway outright and only held an easement therein. Landower-1
also claimed on appeal that Landower-2 failed to adequately satisfy adverse
possession in the roadway. After analysis of adverse possession, the
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appellate court also held that Landower-2 properly satisfied the
requirements and held an easement in the land via adverse possession.
Arkansas
Peregrine Trading, LLC v. Rowe, 2018 Ark. App. 176, 2017 WL 1178183.
Company sued Landowner, alleging that Landowner committed trespass
when his sewage line ran underneath Company’s adjoining property and
leaked sewage into the ground. Trial court granted a directed verdict for
Landowner, holding that Company was made aware by the presence of the
sewage line for the statutory period necessary to establish a prescriptive
easement. The appellate court affirmed, holding that because the line had
been installed in 1993 and because portions of the line were visible from
above the ground, a reasonable inspection by Company would have put
Company on notice of the presence of the lines. Additionally, because
Landowner diligently inspected his sewage line, the appellate court upheld
the trial court’s decision to dismiss Company’s claims of negligence and
nuisance.
Colorado
CAW Equities, L.L.C. v. City of Greenwood Vill., 2018 COA 42M, No.
17CA0212, 2018 WL 1417920.
Landowner sued City, alleging that City’s proposed public walkway
through Landowner’s property was an unauthorized exercise of eminent
domain. Landowner argued that Colorado Const. art. XVI, § 7 (“§7”),
which allows for private condemnation of public projects if ditches and
culverts are necessary, is self-executing and that Landowner did not need to
show any injury in order to privately condemn such projects that interfere
with private ditches that allow for the flow of water. The court disagreed,
holding that §7 was not self-executing and may be regulated by eminent
domain statutes. To hold otherwise, the court explained, would allow
private property owners an unfettered ability to condemn property without
any guiding principles. Furthermore, so long as City could build its trail
without extinguishing Landowner’s prior public use of the ditch, no
exigency existed which required the condemnation of the trail project.
Therefore, Landowner lacked the legal authority to condemn City’s public
trail, and his claim was dismissed.
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Michigan
LaFave v. McCaleb, No.336004, 2018 WL 662267 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 1,
2018).
Property Owners appealed trial court’s ruling that they had abandoned their
easement interests, disputing an undeveloped roadway’s use and claiming
that they used it multiple times per year and that they hoped to develop the
roadway further. The roadway was not necessary to access any of the
surrounding properties as Property Owners used an alternate, developed
roadway. The Court of Appeals of Michigan analyzed the roadway’s use
and found that Property Owner had abandoned any easement interest in the
land underlying the undeveloped roadway for the following reasons: (1)
Property Owner did not use the roadway; (2) there were numerous
impairments preventing public use of the roadway; and (3) there was an
alternate roadway that could be used to access the properties. Therefore,
Property Owner had abandoned any easement interests in the roadway,
which was already vacated locally as a public road.
North Carolina
Regency Lake Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Regency Lake, LLC, No. COA17–
1117, 2018 WL 1597712 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2018).
Landowners’ Association brought suit for declaratory judgment seeking (1)
a declaration that Landowners on the property had a private easement on
the area and (2) an injunction preventing Development Company from
altering or restricting access to the easement. The area in which the
easement is located is owned by Development Company. The trial court
granted a preliminary injunction in favor of Landowners’ Association and
ordered that all remaining owners of property in the area be joined as
parties to the action. Landowners’ Association appealed the court’s order
for joinder. On review of the interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals of
North Carolina reviewed whether the order itself affected a substantial right
of the Landowners’ Association sufficiently to warrant the interlocutory
appeal. Landowners’ Association argued that the order's requirement to join
other landowners in the area deprived it of a substantial right by eliminating
its individual property rights and replacing these rights with a group
property right, which it claimed only exists when exercised along with other
Landowners. The Appellate Court found that Landowners’ Association
failed to prove a substantial right to seek declaratory relief, without joinder
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of other necessary parties who had claims and interests in the property at
issue that would be effected by the court’s order. Thus, the court found that
the order of the trial court did not effect a substantial right of Landowner’s
association, and the interlocutory appeal was dismissed.
Texas
City of Richardson v. Oncor Elec. Delivery, 539 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. 2018).
This case set out to determine whether Electric Distributor (“Utility”) or
City was responsible for payments associated with electric utility
infrastructure relocation of utility poles, wires, and related equipment, after
the widening of a public alleyways. Parties filed suit against one another in
response to City’s request that Utility move its infrastructure, at its own
expense, after widening of City’s alleyway. Under Texas statutory and
common law, utilities must bear relocation or removal costs of any
equipment placed in public rights-of-way upon the reasonable request of the
municipality. Additionally, this requirement was incorporated into the
contract between Utility and City. However, Utility argued that a newly
adopted tariff – a schedule of the utility containing rates, regulations, and
other items concerning the relationship with its customers – relieved Utility
from its duty to pay relocation costs. The Supreme Court of Texas found
that (1) the contract between Utility and City governed when a municipality
requests utility relocation for public rights-of-way purposes, and
alternatively (2) the tariff would govern when the municipality was acting
as an end-use customer in its request. Therefore, in this case, common and
statutory law would be controlling, and Utility would be responsible for the
relocation costs of the electric utility infrastructure.
XTO Energy, Inc. v. EOG Res., Inc., No. 04–17–00046–CV, 2018 WL
1610940 (Tex. App. Apr. 4, 2018).
In a title dispute over a mineral estate, Producer sought a declaration of
ownership over Landowners. The dispute arose regarding a clause in the
deed granting title to Landowners, which authorized grantor to convey title
to the 7/8 mineral interest free and clear of a Lien and Deed of Trust lien to
Landowners. Producer filed a trespass-to-try title suit against Landowners
claiming that it owned the full mineral interest pursuant to the Deed. At
trial, the lower court found that according to the chain of title, all of the
rights and interest in the mineral estate belonged to Landowners and their
predecessors-in-interest. Producer appealed claiming Landowners failed to
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carry their burden for summary judgment to establish superior title to the
Mineral Estate and that it had carried its own burden in showing its
ownership of the Mineral Estate. The parties presented competing
interpretations of the clause in the deed at issue. The appellate court chose
to look at the plain language of the clause in its interpretation. Based on the
four corners and the plain language of the deed, the court ruled that the
Landowners were in fact the owners of the mineral estate, and the trial court
properly granted summary judgment.
Other Land Issues – Federal
E.D. Kentucky
M.L. Johnson Family Props., LLC v. Zinke, No. 7:16–CV–6–KKC, 2018
WL 1413380 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 21, 2018).
This case arises out of a dispute between common owners regarding
whether their collectively held property should be opened up for mining.
Owner-1 requested judicial review, bringing this challenge of the
administrative decision in favor of Owner-2, effectively terminating a
mining cessation order and allow mining activity on the property. The
“right to enter and surface mine” was conveyed under the authority of the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, which requires that the
mining operations must be agreed to by owners or be consistent with
relevant state law. Owner-2 claimed that this regulation allowed the mining
activity to be valid even without all consent because of the applicability of
state co-tenancy laws, since the mining regulations “should not be
interpreted as preempting common law rights of entry.” The court affirmed
the administrative decision to allow the mining permit and activity, using
the Chevron test for deference to the administrative agency, essentially
determining that the relevant statute was not ambiguous and the agency’s
actions were not unreasonable. The court denied Owner-1’s motion for
summary judgment and granted cross-motions for summary judgment filed
by mining company and by the reviewing administrative department in
support of Owner-2. Please note that this decision has been appealed to the
Sixth Circuit.
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Federal Claims
Waverley View Inv’rs, LLC v. United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 593 (Fed. Cl.
2018).
Landowner sued United States, claiming that Army affected a permanent
physical taking of Landowner’s property when it installed a gravel access
well and monitoring wells. The trial court determined that Landowner was
entitled to $1.06 per square foot of the property physically occupied by
Army, but neither party could provide the court with an estimate of the
area. Landowner claimed that Army occupied 53,353 square feet of the
property, while Army claimed that it occupied only 29,928 square feet.
However, the court determined that because Army failed to include a
twenty-five foot “buffer zone” to allow for maneuverability and routine use
in their calculations, Landowner’s calculation was proper, and that
calculation of property occupied by Army was the proper measurement.
Please note, an appeal has since been filed by Landowner to the Federal
Circuit.
N.D. California
State v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 286 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
State opposed Agency’s action suspending or relaxing its regulations on
natural gas waste management and conservation and seeking a preliminary
injunction. Intervenors and Agency requested a transfer to District of
Wyoming because of a related case in that jurisdiction. However, the court
here stated that the claims were too different, involving separate legal
issues, even though the subject rules were somewhat correlated. Agency did
not show that the transfer would be best overall and clearly in its favor,
which it must do to effectively request transfer. Convenience for all parties
involved is still a dominant factor considered, even when the cases are
directly related. Further, it was not imperative for the “interests of justice”
that the case be reviewed along with the case regarding the underlying
regulation in Wyoming. The court held that Agency must have some
legitimate justification for the suspension rule and the change in its
regulations. The court held that such changes cannot be inconsistent with
the general scheme of regulations without some good reason. The court also
found that there was no evidence that the original rule negatively impacted
the energy sector or had other significant negative effects, so the suspension
rule was not well-supported as a necessary measure. The court offered that,
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in this case, it was not tasked with reviewing the underlying rule, rather,
merely whether the change in rules was justified by Agency. The court
granted State’s request for a preliminary injunction due to the high
likelihood that State would win its challenge, because Agency’s action was
not significantly supported with good evidence. Also, the court held that
State suffered “irreparable injury caused by the waste of publicly owned
natural gas, increased air pollution and associated health impacts, and
exacerbated climate impacts.” Therefore, the court determined that State
would continue to suffer additional harm via “significant and imminent” air
pollution if the preliminary injunction was not granted.
N.D. New York
Cooper Crouse-Hinds, LLC v. City of Syracuse, No. 16-CV-1201
(MAD/ATB), 2018 WL 840056 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2018).
Companies (“Company”) sued City and County over two consent orders
regarding company’s landfill site (“Site”). Company sought relief under
CERCLA and several state law claims, and City moved to dismiss. The
district court found that Company may proceed under section 107 of
CERCLA regarding one consent order “[b]ecause [it] does not resolve
[company’s] liability.” As for another consent order in which liability is
conditioned upon a “certificate of completion,” the Second Circuit has not
resolved that issue and district courts have split as to whether conditional
liability will allow a party to go forward under section 113(f)(3)(B). The
court did not decide that issue considering the parties did not sufficiently
brief it. As for the state law claims, all but one were dismissed for “failure
to comply with the relevant notice-of-claim requirements.” Company’s
claim for breach of contract against County survive the motion to dismiss,
however, because it is timely and not preempted by CERCLA considering
the CERCLA issues are still unresolved.
Other Land Issues – State
California
Citizens for Open & Pub. Participation v. City of Montebello, B277060,
2018 WL 636250 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2018).
Advocacy Group (“Advocate”) claimed that City improperly approved and
enabled development of a residential real estate project. Specifically,
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Advocate challenged the trial court’s finding (1) that City did not violate
the Ralph M. Brown Act or local planning and zoning laws and (2) that the
court abused its discretion in striking portions of Advocate’s brief as
outside the scope of its claims. The California appellate court began by
reviewing the brief’s claims and held that the trial court was properly within
its authority to exclude portions of Advocate’s brief. Next the court
analyzed the Brown Act which places public notice requirements on local
agencies regarding the project being considered for approval before a
meeting is held. Advocate claimed that notice was properly given to the
public via paper notice but that the location of meeting was mistakenly
listed on City’s website. The appellate court held that City had complied
with the act and that the mistake was not prejudicial. Lastly, the court
addressed whether the approved project was outside of the general plan of
City’s planning and zoning laws. However, the court held that the project
was not inconsistent with City’s general housing plan. Please note that this
is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Florida
Pelican Creek Homeowners, LLC v. Pulverenti, No. 5D16–4046, 2018 WL
664239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2018).
Property Owners appeal the denial of an injunction seeking to remove Dock
Owners’ boathouse and dock from their property. The dispute arises from a
dedication in 1960 by the property developers. To determine who owns the
property, the court had to determine three issues: (1) was the dedication a
common law dedication or a statutory dedication, (2) did the developer
reserve the land to itself in the dedication, and (3) how much land was
subject to the dedication. The court concluded that the dedication was a
common law dedication because the dedication itself did not reference the
state statute governing statutory dedications and the parties did not intend to
form a statutory dedication. The court then concluded that the developer did
not reserve the land to itself because it was not clearly provided in the
dedication and the general rule is that a dedication does not reserve any
rights to the conveyor unless expressly stated in the dedication. Finally, the
court concluded that all of the land is subject to the dedication and therefore
the Property Owners own the property dedicated in the conveyance. The
general rule is that abutting land owners each receive half of the property
dedicated. However, the exception to this rule is where the dedication is of
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land at the edge of the plat, which is applicable here. Under the exception,
abutting land owners receive full ownership of the property dedicated.
Louisiana
St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Violet Dock Port, Inc., 20170434 (La. 1/30/18); 239 So. 3d 243.
Port Authority selected Land Owner’s property for expropriation in order to
facilitate expansion. Land Owner removed the expropriation case to a
federal court, which rejected Land Owner’s request for dismissal and found
in favor of Port Authority on the ultimate purchase price for the land. An
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, and Land Owner appealed
to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The Court affirmed in part, holding that
nothing in the record indicated that the trial court was “manifestly
erroneous” in its findings that Port Authority’s intended use of the property
(1) qualified as a “Public Purpose,” as the state constitutionally required for
such a taking, and (2) qualified under the “business enterprise clause,” and
was neither to halt Land Owner’s revenue stream nor halt its competition.
The Court also held though that the trial court used the wrong standard in
evaluating Property Owner’s claim that the land was not valuated under the
proper presumption that the land would be used to its “highest and best
use.” The Court also held that the appellate court’s failure to use a de novo
standard of review on the issue exacerbated the error. Accordingly, the
Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding the case for a proper
determination on the question of what amount would constitute just
compensation in this case.
Nebraska
Cain v. Custer Cty Bd. of Equalization, 906 N.W.2d 285 (Neb. 2018).
County Assessor (“Assessor”) raised the value of Property Owner’s
property, increasing the property tax by nearly 250 percent, primarily due to
Assessor’s re-classification of the property away from “irrigated grassland.”
Property Owner protested the assessment due to the fact that he had not
been granted an evidentiary hearing before the County Board of
Equalization. Property Owner petitioned Tax Equalization and Review
Commission (“TERC”), which affirmed Assessor’s increased evaluations.
Property Owner appealed, resulting in a finding of plain error and reversal,
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remanding the case to the TERC, which then issued a new order reversing
Assessor’s evaluations for three of the ten parcels of property in question,
but once again affirming the other seven parcels. Property Owner appealed
once more. The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that: (1) Property Owner’s
due process rights were not violated because there is no due process right to
oral argument specifically; (2) TERC’s decision to disregard Property
Owner’s testimony—and that of a real estate appraiser—as evidence in its
determination resulted in an erroneous evidentiary standard being followed;
and (3) that Property Owner satisfied his burden to show “by a
preponderance of the evidence” that Assessor’s valuation was excessive.
The Court also held that a lower number was appropriate, providing the
total valuation of Property Owner’s land. Based on these holdings, the
Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its
judgment.
New Jersey
Rapisardi v. Lange, No. A–3722–16T2, 2018 WL 1473918 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Mar. 27, 2018).
Landowner-1 sued Landowner-2 for trespass, alleging that Landowner-2’s
boat ramp that extended over Landowner-1’s small strip of land violated his
riparian rights. Landowner-2 argued that while the ramp did extend over
that small strip of land, it was irrelevant because the land was completely
submerged under water and below the mean high-water mark of the creek.
The trial court held that the small strip of submerged land was granted to
Landowner-1 by the State and was a riparian grant, rather than a riparian
right. Therefore, Landowner-1 did not possess the exclusive right to use
that land. The appellate court affirmed, explaining that there is a difference
between a riparian right and a riparian grant, which is a separate estate in
land. Landowner-1 lost title to the small strip of land once it became
submerged below the mean high-water mark, and can therefore not restrict
access to the creek from Landowner-2’s property. Please note that this is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
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Ohio
Wendt v. Dickerson, 2018-Ohio-1034, No. 2017 AP 08 0024, 2018 WL
1391624.
Surface Owner initially brought a claim against Mineral Owner, asserting
its rights to all severed mineral interest in the subject property. Surface
Owner appealed a lower court decision denying its motion for summary
judgment against Mineral Owner, which was brought after significant legal
history regarding this issue between the two parties. Surface Owner
attempted to gain mineral rights through the state’s Dormant Mineral Act,
asserting that its mineral interest in the property had vested through the
inaction of Mineral Owners. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision
to deny Surface Owner’s motion for summary judgment, determining that
Mineral Owner had taken appropriate steps in accordance with the relevant
state laws to assert and protect its mineral interest in the subject property.
Accordingly, such property was not determined to be judicially abandoned.
The court also disagreed with Surface Owner’s claim that a potential
dormant mineral interest was a vested property interest and held that such
an interest was not considered a taking or violation of due process.
Tennessee
Harakas Constr., Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty., No.
M2016–01540–COA–R–CV, 2018 WL 583919 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29,
2018).
Construction Company (“Company”) filed suit against Local Government
and Developer after all three parties’ work on a sewer line project for a
local condominium project led Company to miss out on promised payment
from the project. The trial court granted motions for summary judgment by
both Local Government and Developer, holding that Local Government had
sovereign immunity and was thus precluded from the suit, and that the suit
against Developer was insufficient because (1) Developer had shown that
its operations met the standard of care required for the work performed, and
(2) Company’s negligence allegation against Developer was not the
proximate cause of any harm to Company, because all harm in question was
caused by the original financer of the project filing for bankruptcy. In
response, Company appealed the dismissal of both claims. The Court of
Appeals of Tennessee held that: (1) no exception existed which erased or
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caused Local Government’s sovereign immunity to be waived in this case;
(2) because no statement was made which Company could have
detrimentally relied on, Government was not estopped from using such a
defense; and (3) because the evidence in the record supported the trial
court’s decision, there was no error in the granting of summary judgment to
Developer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decisions of the trial court.
Texas
Bush v. Lone Oak Club, LLC, No. 01-17-00140-CV, 2018 WL 1003540
(Tex. App. Feb. 22, 2018).
Landowner sued Texas Land Commission (“Commission”), alleging
ownership of the bed of a bayou on their property. Commissioner had
previously determined that the beds of tidally influenced watercourses were
owned by Texas and subject to public use. Landowner argued that the
Commission had attempted to “cloud” or “impair” its title by claiming state
ownership and was interfering with Landowner's right to possession and
quiet enjoyment of the property by encouraging public use of the contested
waterways. Because the court found supporting state law on "watercourse
or navigable stream" as not excluding water that is "tidally affected," the
court found that the non-conveyance of land influenced by State-owned
water deprived Landowner.
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SELECTED ELECTRICITY DECISIONS
Traditional Generation
New Mexico
New Energy Econ., Inc. v. New Mexico Pub. Reg. Comm’n, No. S-1-SC35697, 2018 WL 1149928 (N.M. Mar. 5, 2018).
The Public Service Company of New Mexico (“PNM”) is part-owner and
operator of the San Juan Regional Generation Station (“San Juan Plant”).
The San Juan Plant consists of four coal-powered units and is subject to
large production of emissions that cause or contribute to haze. PNM held
multiple hearings and discussions with the New Mexico Governor and
other interested parties to determine the best way for PNM to comply with
the Federal Clean Air Act. Meeting participants determined that the best
way to do so was to retire two of the units at the San Juan Plant.
Regulatory Commission rejected this plan because PNM could not
produce evidence of capability of replacing the lost production from the
two retired units. After hiring a hearing examiner to address the merits of
the application for shutting down the units and submitting multiple
supplemental stipulations, the hearing examiner advised Regulatory
Commission to accept the application subject to multiple additional
stipulations. Energy Advocate objected multiple times throughout the
process, alleging that Regulatory Commission accepted PNM’s limited
alternatives in violation of the law and challenged the final decision in the
Supreme Court of New Mexico. The Court ultimately held that
Regulatory Commission comprehensively considered the merits of PNM’s
proposals during multiple different stipulation proceedings and that its
decision to support the proposal and dismiss the protests against it was
lawful.
Renewable Generation – Federal
D. Colorado
SPower Dev. Co. v. Colorado Pub. Util. Comm’n, No. 17–cv–00683–
CMA–NYW, 2018 WL 1014142 (D. Colo. Feb. 22, 2018).
Company filed claims for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment,
claiming that it was restricted from contracting its quality facilities (“QF”)
with a utility without a specific bidding process, which is in conflict with
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the Federal Energy and Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) regulations
on such activity. Commission filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that
since Company had an opportunity to participate in electronic resource
planning (“ERP”), which would have allowed it to contract with utilities
outside of a bidding process, its challenge to the regulation was not
substantiated with a legitimate injury. Therefore, it had no standing to
bring a claim. The court disagreed with this argument, stating that it was
irrelevant whether or not Company could participate in ERP, since it still
suffered an injury, which was caused by Commission’s action. The court
also addressed the argument that it should take a “Burford abstention,”
essentially leaving complicated state-related matters to state courts. The
court held that a situation calling for such an abstention is rare and not
relevant for this case because this case involved preemption of federal
rules and was thus appropriate for a federal court. The court accordingly
denied Commission’s Motion to Dismiss.
Renewable Generation – State
Arizona
SolarCity Corp. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue, 413 P.3d 678 (Ariz. 2018).
Solar Producer sued State, seeking tax-friendly treatment on solar panels
installed on the properties of Solar Producer's customers. Because the
solar panels are considered to have no value under the relevant tax code,
Solar Producer argued that the equipment should be assessed as having
"zero value". The Supreme Court of Arizona concluded that State's
department of revenue does not have the statutory authority to value Solar
Producer's panels and, therefore, remanded the case to the lower court to
determine whether county assessors possess the valuation authority. The
court found that because Solar Producer profited through leasing the
panels to its customers, the panels should be valued under the tax code's
business personal property classification rather than as personal property.
Maryland
Dan's Mountain Wind Force, LLC v. Allegany Cty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals,
2018 WL 774760 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018).
Constructor seeking to build wind turbines on leased property applied for
variances and special exceptions from the Board of Zoning (“Board”)
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because the areas in which it desired to construct the turbines were within
separation distances. Board denied the request for variances citing that
Constructor failed to show the areas of land were sufficiently unique to
each other that the multiple number of variances requested were in
harmony with the spirit and intent of the zoning regulations, as required
by state law for the issuance of a variance. Constructor appealed this
denial of variances to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. The
appellate court found that Board applied the incorrect standard in
reviewing Constructor’s application. It held that Board improperly found
that the areas were not unique because they were similar to each other.
Because Board failed to apply the proper standards and analysis for the
variance application, the appellate court remanded the case back to Board
to apply the proper analyses without making any decisions on the merits
of the case. Please note that this is an unpublished opinion of the court;
therefore, state or federal court rules should be consulted before citing the
case as precedent.
New Jersey
Napier v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., A–4408–15T2, 2018 WL 1308868
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 14, 2018).
Complainant filed a claim asserting that Company was receiving more
renewable energy credits than it should be, based on its own formula for
calculations. Complainant also claimed that Company failed to comply
with regulations regarding energy reporting. These claims were brought
on behalf of a group, with Complainant as an interested party. The claims,
based on “unfair competition and unjust enrichment,” were brought due to
the negative economic impact caused by the undervaluing of such credits,
which was a result of Company’s actions. Upon review, the ALJ
determined that there was “no issue of material fact” and granted
Company’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the trial court
granted a motion to dismiss brought by Company, because Complainant
did not bring a claim that could be granted relief. The court also agreed
with the lower court that Complainant’s discovery requests were not
necessary and could be denied because Company had already responded
adequately. First, the court ultimately affirmed the lower court’s decision
because (1) Board did approve the method of calculation and
measurement of the credits, and (2) such methods were in accordance
with Board’s regulations, despite Complainant’s assertion to the contrary.
The court determined that when Board approved Company’s metering
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program, it, in effect, allowed and approved such methods. Second, even
though Complainant claimed that Company failed to show that
Complainant did not present a genuine issue of fact, the burden to be met
was not assigned to Company. Though the court affirmed the lower
court’s decision, it also designated the dismissal to be without prejudice,
so that Complainant could bring potential future meritorious claims.
Please note that this is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore,
state or federal court rules should be consulted before citing the case as
precedent.
Virginia
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 810 S.E.2d 880 (Va.
2018).
Service Provider filed suit with the State Corporation Commission
seeking declaratory judgment order asserting its right to sell electricity
provided from renewable energy to large customers within the operating
territory of Public Service Company authorized by the state to provide
electricity. Normally, large customers would be subject to five-years'
advance notice requirement if they wished to return to Public Service
Company. The State Corporation Commission determined that large
customers could purchase electricity provided from renewable energy
from competitive service provider without being subject to notice
requirement. Public Service Company appealed. The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed the order of the State Corporation Commission, holding
that certain large customers may purchase electricity from any licensed
supplier of energy in the state without being subject to the statutory notice
requirement. It found that customers who satisfy the size requirements of
the statutory definition of “large” could purchase electricity from a
competitive service provider under section (A)(5), so long as they
satisfied other requirements under the statute. However, the 5-year notice
requirement doesn’t apply to purchases of electric energy provided by
renewable energy from competitive providers.
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Rates – Federal
D.C. Circuit
Nw. Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 884 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir.
2018).
Utility requested review of Federal Energy Regulation Commission’s
(“FERC”) order requiring that Utility revise their framework for charges
to customers, and determining that such charges were “not just and
reasonable.” Commission allows utilities to charge utility customers
additional rates to compensate for extra energy production and used to
balance electricity demands, called “regulation service.” However, while
charges for this additional power produced are allowed to be charged
generally to customers, they still must be “just and reasonable.” After
struggling to meet demand while still maintaining cost efficiency, Utility
constructed a new facility to generate additional power and make
“regulation service” more effective. Utility attempted to transfer the costs
of this new facility to its customers in the same way that it had the
previous regulation costs. Commission found Utility’s modifications to its
rates, which imposed these additional costs, to be unreasonable and
required it to compensate its customers for these charges. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia determined that this was an
“overcollection” case rather than a “cost-allocation” case, as Utility
asserted, which made a difference in what precedent was applied and
whether a refund was appropriate. Thus, the court held in favor of
Commission, finding Commission’s decision “reasonable and reasonably
explained.”
Rates – State
Arizona
Freeport Minerals Corp. v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, No. 2 CA-CC 20170001, 2018 WL 1633287 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2018).
Electric utility service provider (“Utility”) filed a notice of intent to
change its rates in 2015 to increase its return on invested capital. Many
government bodies, advocacy groups, and corporations intervened, and
multiple settlement discussions followed. Over the process of settlement,
Utility agreed to lower the total revenue increase it sought. However,
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nothing was changed concerning allocation among rate classes. Upon
review of the revenue allocation, the Arizona Corporation Commission
(“Commission”) adopted a nearly identical allocation scheme as was
proposed by Utility despite challenges and objections by Oil Company
and others. Subject to Commission’s decision, Oil Company requested
review challenging alleged constitutional and statutory violations of the
allocation portion of the decision. Oil Company also proposed alternative
rate allocations. However, on appeal, the court determined that
Commission was empowered by the Arizona Constitution to have sole
discretion in rate allocation. The appellate court also concluded that Oil
Company failed to clearly demonstrate that Commission’s decision was
arbitrary, unlawful, or lacked substantial evidence. Thus, the court
accordingly affirmed the lower court’s ruling.
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS
Bankruptcy
S.D. Texas
Oklahoma State Treasurer v. Linn Operating Inc., No. 6:17-CV-0066, 2018
WL 1535354 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2018).
Operator voluntarily filed for Chapter 11 relief in Bankruptcy Court.
Operator, in its application, requested that claims of owners of
approximately $1,000,000 in unclaimed royalties held by Operator would
be discharged upon confirmation of the plan and thus Operator would hold
on to royalties. The bankruptcy court approved the plan, but the State
Treasurer filed an adverse action seeking proof of claims against Operator
seeking possession of all unclaimed royalties, specifically $965,000 in oil
and gas production proceeds it characterized as abandoned property. The
bankruptcy court dismissed Treasurer’s complaint after finding that the
claim was merely a post-confirmation collateral attack on the debtor’s plan.
Treasurer appealed the dismissal of the claim to the Southern District of
Texas. On appeal, the court reversed the lower court and ruled that the
unclaimed oil and gas royalties were held in trust by Operator for the
Landowners. Thus, the unclaimed royalties were never property of Operator
and were not properties subject to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction or to
confirmation of Operator’s Chapter 11 plan.
Intellectual Property
Federal Circuit
Paice LLC v. Ford Motor Co., 881 F.3d 894 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Automobile Technology Company (“Tech Company”) filed suit against
Automobile Manufacturer (“Manufacturer”) for patent infringement on
several different patents for “hybrid vehicle technology.” Automobile
Manufacturer then filed several inter partes review petitions, which were
reviewed by Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”), which invalidated
several of Company’s claims as obvious and unpatentable. Company
appealed. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that: (1) PTAB’s
finding that a previously issued patent rendered several of Tech Company’s
claims obvious was supported by sufficient evidence; (2) a previous
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publication, which qualified nominally as “prior art” to the patents at issue
in this case, was not actually prior art based on the language included in the
text of a previous application by parties to this case; thus, (3) the patents
invalidated by PTAB based on that previous publication were cast aside
incorrectly. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed PTAB’s
determinations on thirteen of the patent’s claims, and vacated Board’s
determination on six claims, remanding the case for further proceedings
consistent with the court’s holdings.
E.D. Texas
EnerPol, LLC v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., No. 2:17-CV-00394-JRG,
2018 WL 1335191 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2018).
This case concerns the proper construction of claim terms in a patent
application for a degradable polymer made to assist in the process of
creating fractures in the subsurface during oil and gas fracking. The parties
were in dispute concerning the term “polymer-continuous liquid phase.”
Company-1 contended that the phrase constituted two terms while
Company-2 construed it as only one term. Company-1 also proposed that
the term “polymer continuous” entails a network of polymer while
Company-2 contended it is simply a polymer. Finally, the parties disputed
whether or not the term “liquid phase” meant the polymer must be entirely
in liquid form as claimed by Company-2. In this phrase, the court seemed to
find a middle ground, determining that the term meant “polymer in a liquid
state that is greater than fifty percent (50%) by volume of the fluid that does
the fracturing in the formation.” The court further defined the terms
“selected” and “low viscosity” as having their ordinary meanings and “solid
form” as meaning “solid bulk form.”
Other Issues – Federal
D. North Dakota
El Petron Enters., LLC v. Whiting Res. Corp., No. 1:16–cv–090, 2018 WL
1322391 (D.N.D. Mar. 14, 2018).
Lessee sued Distributor, alleging that Distributor had improperly deducted
from the overriding royal interests of Lessee. Lessee argued that
Distributor's deduction for third-party post-production costs was improper
because of language in the assignment's overriding royalty reservation.
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Distributor claimed that the "free and clear of all costs" language in the
assignment described the free-of-production-costs feature of an overriding
royalty, while Lessee contended that the language changed the "at the well"
rule with respect to post-production costs. Citing North Dakota Supreme
Court precedent, the district court held that Distributor should include postproduction costs in assessing an overriding royalty's value, but Distributor
cannot deduct costs from that sum. The court determined that Distributor
could properly deduct post-production costs when used in the Production
Royalty calculation.
Other Issues – State
Colorado
Maralex Res., Inc. v. Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 2018
COA 40, No. 17CA0051, 2018 WL 1417462.
Operator challenged both the search and finding of violations through the
search by Commission. Commission’s search revealed several ongoing
violations, including contaminated soil and equipment not being properly
stored. The Colorado appellate court held that Commission’s search was
not a constitutional violation because the industry is “closely regulated.”
Additionally, the search satisfied a multi-part test that requires: (1) a
legitimate government or public interest, (2) that the search is required to
carry out that government interest; and (3) that the search is part of a
regular or routine schedule and was not completely unforeseeable. Since
Commission’s searches were intended and required to monitor oil and gas
sites and were conducted on a relatively consistent schedule, the test was
satisfied. The court also found that Operator’s claim of interference with the
surface estate was not persuasive because an expansive “surface use
agreement” was in place between Operator as an entity and surface owner
(surface owner owns the company and also acts as Operator). The court
disagreed with the decision of Commission and the lower court in only one
respect: the court reversed the district court’s support of Commission’s
finding that Operator did not reasonably provide Commission access to the
subject property. According to the court, this finding was arbitrary and
capricious on the part of Commission. Ultimately, the court held that
Commission’s search of Operator’s premises, while impromptu, was not in
violation of the state constitution’s protections, even though Operator’s
family resided on the property. The court reversed and remanded the district
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court’s decision regarding the one violation mentioned above but affirmed
the other elements of the decision.
Illinois
Rogers Cartage Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 2018 IL App (5th) 160098,
No. 5–16–0098, 2018 WL 1661799.
Insurer breached its duty to Policyholder when it refused to defend and
indemnify Policyholder’s $7,500,000 settlement in an underlying suit
disputing responsibility of toxic spill cleanups in Illinois. The lower court
found that Insurer’s failure to settle was in bad faith and Insurer therefore
had a duty to pay the settlement. In addition, the court awarded
Policyholder attorney fees. Insurer appealed and argued that the policy's
pollution exclusions applied and barred coverage because Policyholder
intended or expected contamination to result from its actions and because
Policyholder’s toxic discharge was illegal. The Illinois appellate court
upheld the lower court’s finding and held that Insurer breached its duty to
defend by threatening to end coverage if Policyholder settled. Due to the
breach of Insurer’s duty to defend, Insurer was estopped from raising
defenses to coverage. Additionally, the court held that even if Insurer did
not breach this duty, its arguments against coverage held no merit. The
court further held that Policyholder did not intend to cause contamination, it
took measures to contain toxins, and there was insufficient evidence to
show that Policyholder’s actions were illegal. Appellate court also upheld
the lower court’s award for attorney’s fees.
Louisiana
Red Sox Invs., LLC v. City of Shreveport, 51-817 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18)
No. 51,817-CA, 2018 WL 1076799.
This case involves the treatment of several tracts of land that had been
adjudicated to City after the property in question failed to be sold at tax
sale. After the failed sale, City executed mineral leases on the adjudicated
properties. Property Owner claimed that the City illegally took the property,
misallocated mineral lease revenue from the properties, and denied other
owners the opportunity to execute mineral leases on the affected properties.
Property Owner claimed that any lease revenue was to be applied toward
past-due taxes and any amounts over given to the property owners. City
claimed that the law requiring the distribution of lease revenue did not
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apply to mineral leases. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals of Louisiana
agreed and held that City adequately followed the procedure following the
tax sale and that Property Owner was not deprived of the right to lease the
minerals in question and could have done so before City.
Texas
ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann, 61 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 605 (Tex. Mar. 23,
2018).
Lessee requested review of a lower court decision to determine whether the
rule against perpetuities was violated by a lease clause allowing a
distinction for Lessor to hold a non-participating royalty interest “as long
thereafter as there is production” from a well. The Supreme Court of Texas
held that such interest was not eliminated because the referenced interested
was actually “certain to vest” at the time of the lease, even though it was a
future interest. Additionally, the Court noted that since this was a mineral
interest, the issues that accompany the rule against perpetuities, like the
feared restrictions on alienability, are not applicable as in a case of
conveyance of property. The Court also held, however, that the savings
clause contained in the lease, specifically the provision of “other similar
payments,” was too ambiguous, did not provide adequate clarity, and could
not be considered a reflection of the intent of each party. Accordingly, the
Court agreed with the lower court that the ambiguity of the savings clause
required further review and interpretation. The Court also affirmed the
appellate court’s decisions regarding attorney’s fees and that Lessor’s claim
for breach of contract was not barred by the state Natural Resources Code.
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SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS
Federal
9th Circuit
TDY Holdings, LLC v. United States, 885 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2018).
This opinion is an amended decision of a case that was summarized in a
previous volume of the ONE-J journal. The present opinion denied a
petition for rehearing. For the full summary of the previous opinion, please
see Volume 3.5, at page 1291.
10th Circuit
Donelson v. United States, No. 16-5174, 2018 WL 1638825 (10th Cir. Apr.
5, 2018).
Through a class action suit, Complainants appealed Department’s decision
to approve regulatory oil and gas activity because the party claimed such
activity violated NEPA and its private property rights. Complainants
asserted a trespass tort claim, requesting monetary damages and injunctive
relief from such activity. Specifically, Complainants claimed that there was
no follow up activity or monitoring regarding an initial Environmental
Assessment conducted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in order to assess
potential impacts of the oil and gas leases and activity permits, even after
the details of such oil and gas arrangements had changed. Complainants
own surface interests in land which are also involved, via the severed
mineral interests, in oil and gas leasing conducted and approved by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court’s decision, finding that Complainants’ claims were
appropriately dismissed due to Complainants’ failure to “adequately
identify the particular agency actions that aggrieve them and explain how
they are final.” According to the court, Complainants ultimately lacked
standing and the courts lacked jurisdiction to hear such a claim due to the
inadequacy of the supporting information provided. Please note that this is
an unpublished opinion of the court. Therefore, state or federal court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

194

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 4

D.C. Circuit
Sierra Club v. EPA, 884 F.3d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
After EPA proposed new, revised regulations regarding air quality, the
proposed rules were challenged by Advocates. Advocates challenged in two
ways. First, Advocates claimed that a regulation purporting to control
organic pollutant emissions was modified in a way that was inconsistent
with the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). Second, Advocates claimed that the
regulations that controlled operations of boilers were too lax, neglecting to
impose technical pollutant requirements and imposing “qualitative ‘work
practice’ standards” or recommendations to initiate boiler operations “as
expeditiously as possible.” The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that Advocates’ first challenge was valid but that the second
was not. Because EPA did not provide enough support for its change to
organic pollutant limits and its deviation from existing standards,
Advocates’ challenge was granted regarding that claim. However, the
second challenge to EPA’s proposed modified regulations was denied
because such standards, even though not precise, are reasonable estimates
and so were still consistent with the existing regulations.
D. District of Columbia
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, No. 16–1861 (JDB), 2018 WL
1568882 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2018).
In accordance with the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), which requires states to
develop plans to regulate water pollution levels, Maryland and the District
of Columbia together developed a plan to control the amount of trash in the
Anacostia River. But, rather than set “total maximum daily load”
(“TMDL”) of pollutants may enter the river, as is discussed in the CWA,
the two jurisdictions instead jointly created a water quality plan (“Plan”)
establishing a minimum amount of waste to be removed or prevented from
entering the river in order to satisfy the water quality standards.
Consequently, Environmental Advocacy Organization (“Environmental
Organization”) filed suit, challenging EPA’s approval of the Plan and
contending that its proposed approach would be inconsistent with the
language of the CWA. Ultimately, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia found for Environmental Organization noting that the
Plan, as currently laid out, did not adequately establish a “maximum daily
load” consistent with the plain language and meaning of the phrase as used
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in the CWA. As such, approval of the Plan was vacated and remanded to
the EPA.
D. Montana
W. Org. of Res. Councils v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. CV 16-21-GFBMM, 2018 WL 1475470 (D. Mont. Mar. 26, 2018).
Conservation Advocates challenged the Bureau of Land Management’s
(“BLM”) plan revisions related to habitat management of federally owned
lands throughout Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Wyoming. Conservation Advocates sought recourse from a variety of
environmental claims based on BLM's alleged violation of the National
Environmental Policy Act. The district court ruled that, because the BLM
did not entirely update the plans to reflect a full consideration of climate
change impacts on resources, BLM would be required to prepare
environmental analyses to supplement the existing updated management
plan. The court did not make a final ruling on Conservation Advocate's
request to enjoin the leasing or development of energy resources on the
effected land. The court found the BLM's failure to develop alternative
levels of potential coal development as inadequate for allowing the BLM's
to make a "reasoned choice" about the best course of action as to closing
land for coal mining.
N.D. Illinois
Hammond, Kennedy, Whitney & Co. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 16-cv9808, 2018 WL 587182 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2018).
Manufacturer acquired, via a stock purchase, a property that was later found
to have contamination due to underground gas storage tanks. Attorney,
acting on behalf of the property’s predecessor, filed suit seeking a
declaratory judgment that Attorney would not have to indemnify
Manufacture for environmental cleanup and related costs at the site. As
required by state law, once the contamination was discovered and certain
level of pollutants detected, Manufacturer notified the state and relayed to
Attorney that the stock purchase agreement provided for indemnification
for the contamination. Attorney brought suit seeking a declaration that
Attorney was under no duty to indemnify Manufacturer for the remediation
and associated costs arising out of the storage tank contamination. The
stock purchase agreement was governed by New York law, while the
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environmental claims were subject to the laws of Indiana, the state in which
the contamination took place. The stock purchase agreement contained
warranties and indemnity provisions outlining Manufacturer’s process for
future environmental issues. The court found that Attorney did not meets its
burden in seeking the declaration from the court. Manufacturer properly
notified Attorney of the breach of warranty, the reasoning for the warranty
claims, and the legal duty and requirement for Manufacturer to remediate.
Therefore, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, found that Attorney failed to prove that no
material fact existed regarding Manufacturer’s remediation claims.
W.D. Pennsylvania
EQT Prod. Co. v. Terra Servs., LLC, No. 14-1053, 2018 WL 658871 (W.D.
Pa. Feb. 1, 2018).
Operator filed suit against Water Treatment Company (“Company”) for
breach of express warranty, breach of contract, contractual indemnification,
and common law indemnification for Company’s actions resulting in
damage which caused “leakage of impaired fluids . . . into surrounding land
and water.” Company filed for partial summary judgment on its claim for
attorney’s fees in the action, and on Operator’s Petition for Review of the
civil penalty assessed against it by the Environmental Hearing Board
(“Board”). The Pennsylvania district court found that (1) there was no basis
in the language of the contract for Company’s assertion that the document
directly contemplated the allowance of attorney’s fees; (2) the Restatement
of Contracts was inapplicable, and the facts of this particular instance were
enough that a court could find consequential damages allowable; and (3)
because the civil penalty was assessed to Operator without consideration of
the potential liability of its subcontractors. Thus, Operator’s Petition for
Review of the civil penalty was not barred by res judicata. Accordingly, the
court denied both of Company’s partial motions for summary judgment.
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State
California
Don’t Cell Our Parks v. City of San Diego, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 15, 2018).
Preservationist filed a writ of mandate against City, claiming that City had
impermissibly approved the construction of a small cellphone service tower
in a public park. Preservationist claimed that the project fell within an
alteration to legislation demanding that parks may only be used for
recreational purposes and that any other purpose must be agreed upon by a
two-thirds majority vote by the city council. The trial court denied
Preservationist’s petition. The appellate court explained that City has the
discretion to set aside this two-thirds majority vote requirement for any
purposes deemed necessary by City. Because the proposed cellphone tower
would lead to enhanced coverage for the community and because the tower
was relatively inconspicuous on a nine-acre plot of land, the appellate court
affirmed and allowed the construction of the tower.
Rodeo Citizens Ass’n v. Cty. of Contra Costa, 22 Cal. App. 5th 214 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2018).
Citizens Association (“Citizens”) appealed a decision in which the trial
court issued a peremptory writ of mandate, in Citizens’ favor, requiring a
county to reevaluate various air quality issues in an Environmental Impact
Report (“EIR”), but rejected Citizens’ remaining arguments. The California
Court of Appeal for the First District, Division 3 found that the following
did not fail to comply with the requirements set forth in the California
Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”): (1) the description of the “Propane
Recovery Project” and (2) the analysis used in making determinations
regarding greenhouse gas emissions and environmental hazards.
Accordingly, the appellate court found no error by the lower court and
affirmed the writ as originally issued.
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New Jersey
New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 181 A.3d 257, (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018).
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”) brought
suit against oil refinery owner (“Refinery”) for claims under the Spill Act,
common law claims of public nuisance, trespass, and strict liability, and
sought natural resource damages (“NRD”) for the discharge of hazardous
substances at two facilities. During trial, NJDEP provided public notice of a
previous settlement proposed by Refinery in order to release certain NRD
claims. The release of the information regarding the settlement caused an
uproar with people objecting to the settlement. At trial, the court rejected
the applications of environmental groups and a state senator to intervene
finding that these parties did not have standing, and the court approved the
consent judgement regarding the proposed settlement. These environmental
groups and state senator appeal the rejection of their motions to intervene
and the consent judgment. On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division, upheld the lower court’s consent judgment. However, it
found that the environmental groups had standing to appeal the trial court’s
consent judgment based on their broad representation of citizens’ interests
throughout the state, but the state Senator lacked standing because he
lacked a personal or pecuniary interest adversely affected by the judgment.
North Carolina
EnvironmentaLEE v. N.C. Dep’t of Envtl. & Nat. Res. Div. of Waste Mgmt.,
No. COA17-907, 2018 WL 1597452 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2018).
Citizens appealed Agency’s decision regarding standing of a permit to use
coal ash as infill for mines. The ALJ converted Citizens’ motion for
summary judgment into a motion for involuntary dismissal, which was then
granted because Citizens failed to provide sufficient proof that their
interests were violated or that Permittees otherwise acted inappropriately.
The court partially affirmed and partially reversed the decision, holding that
the applicability of the final decision regarding mined or excavated areas
was affirmed, but the applicability of the final decision regarding unmined
or unexcavated areas was reversed, and related permits were improperly
approved and issued and were therefore revoked. This judgment meant that
mining activity was allowed to go on in already active mined areas, “but
coal ash may only be used as structural fill in the areas mined or excavated
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at the time the permits were issued.” The court held that the ALJ and
superior court erred in both interpreting procedural rules and applying
standards of review. Therefore, this matter was remanded to fix the
referenced errors and allow Citizens to provide additional supporting
information, as needed.
Pennsylvania
Consol. Rail Corp. v. ACE Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2018 PA Super 68, No.
1376 EDA 2015, 2018 WL 1442507.
Railroad sued Insurer, claiming that the insurance policy between the two
parties was ambiguous in its definition of the “occurrences” for which
Railroad would be insured. Railroad argued that the contamination that
damaged a third party’s property was attributable to Railroad’s predecessor
in interest, but that this “occurrence” was covered by Insurer’s ambiguous
policy. However, because Railroad could not point to specific instances of a
predecessor’s activities that caused the contamination, it failed to meet the
requisite burden of proof, so the matter of contract interpretation was moot.
Insurer claimed that Railroad knew that the sites covered by the policy were
contaminated and that any losses suffered as a result of acquiring those
properties were covered by the “Known Loss Doctrine.” Therefore, Insurer
claimed that any policy covering these sites was unenforceable. However,
the court denied Insurer’s motion for summary judgment on this theory,
finding that Insurer failed to adequately prove Railroad’s knowledge of the
contamination at the time it acquired the properties.
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